讲座简介：How do non-elite founding teams attract capital? Building on signaling theory, we propose that disclosing advisory relationships, or formal ties to prominent entrepreneurs, experts, or public figures, can serve as input-based signals of capability and credibility. We predict that disclosed advisor affiliations may substitute for missing input-based signals but are less likely to replace output-based signals such as traction. Finally, the value of such signals depends on investor experience and industry context. We test these ideas in a randomized field experiment embedded in a startup pitch competition in Singapore, where we manipulate whether investors see information on advisors, founder credentials, and traction for the same ventures. Disclosing advisor ties enhances investor evaluations when founder credentials are weak but does not compensate for absent traction. We also find that advisor effects are weaker for more experienced investors and stronger for B2B-oriented startups. Our study highlights advisory affiliations as a compensatory mechanism for non-elite founding teams and documents theoretical contingencies for when third-party endorsements matter most.
主讲人简介：王鹤丽教授现为新加坡管理大学李光前商学院战略管理讲席教授（Janice Bellace Professor）、研究生院院长，现任Journal of International Business Studies的副主编，曾担任Academy of Management Journal和Academy of Management Review的副主编，以及Management Organization Review的咨询编辑。王鹤丽教授的研究聚焦于企业资源基础理论、战略人力资本、利益相关者管理和企业社会责任，众多研究成果发表于战略与组织领域顶级期刊，包括Academy of Management Journal、Academy of Management Review、Strategic Management Journal、Organization Science和Journal of International Business Studies等。