讲座内容简介：The Non-Fungible Token (NFT) market is fast-growing, but increasing competition among platforms poses significant challenges in choosing the optimal operational strategies and finding the right ways to collaborate. This paper provides a theoretical investigation into NFT market design by focusing on two key platform policies: (1) royalty payments the original NFT creators receive when a resale transaction occurs, and (2) NFT interoperability, i.e., whether resale is allowed on a different platform than where the NFT was originally minted. We show that when platforms maintain centralized control over royalty policies and do not permit interoperability, the NFT equilibrium can take one of three forms depending on the degree of market speculation: “free royalty”, where creators earn exclusively from the primary price; “free airdrop”, where creators earn exclusively from the resale royalty; and “intermediate royalty”, where creators earn from both sources. However, the equilibrium shifts when interoperability is permitted (always to free royalty) or when royalty decisions are decentralized to individual creators (always to free airdrop). Comparing the NFT equilibria under different policies, we find that under centralized royalty policies, NFT interoperability can create a win-win outcome by improving both platform profits and social welfare. In contrast, under decentralized royalty policies, NFT interoperability consistently results in a lose-lose outcome. These findings suggest that platforms should only collaborate on NFT interoperability if they maintain decision-making authority over royalty policies. In this case, we further identify that the win-win outcome is most likely to occur when market speculation is at moderately low levels.
主讲人简介：刘靓晨，中国人民大学商学院管理科学与工程系助理教授。北京大学光华管理学院管理学博士。主要研究兴趣包括：区块链与供应链管理、零工经济、运营管理和营销、收益管理与定价、策略型消费者等。曾在Management Science、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management等期刊上发表多篇论文。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目和面上项目、教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目，参与国家自然科学基金重点项目。