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题目(Title):
Frivolous or Meritorious Lawsuits? Judicial Efficiency and Corporate Disclosure
主讲人(Speaker):
Sterling Huang
开始时间(Start Time):
2025-10-15 10:00
结束时间(End Time):
2025-10-15 11:30
报告地点(Place):
SEM501
主办单位(Organization):
创业与管理学院
协办单位(Co-organizer):
简介(Brief Introduction):
讲座内容简介:
We study how judicial efficiency affects the composition of shareholder litigation lawsuits and its impact on corporate disclosure. Exploiting the staggered adoption of the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM) system across U.S. federal district courts, we find that improved judicial efficiency significantly reduces firms’ exposure to frivolous lawsuits while increasing the incidence of meritorious claims. These shifts in composition of litigation risk lead to more frequent earnings guidance, more extensive and readable MD&A discussions, and greater disclosure of both good and bad news among treated firms (located in jurisdictions that adopted the CM system). The effects are more pronounced for firms headquartered in states permitting third-party litigation financing and those with weaker regulatory oversight or internal governance. We also find an increase in market reactions to management forecasts among treated firms following the CM system adoption, consistent with enhanced disclosure credibility. Our findings highlight the importance of understanding judicial frictions in affecting both the composition of shareholder litigation and corporate information environment.
主讲人简介:
Sterling Huang教授现任上海纽约大学商学研究生项目副院长、会计学教授。在加入纽约大学之前,他曾任新加坡管理大学会计学副教授。黄教授毕业于欧洲工商管理学院(INSEAD)管理学专业。在攻读博士学位前,他曾在悉尼普华永道会计师事务所担任审计师。
他的主要研究方向聚焦于不同公司治理机制如何缓解代理冲突并优化企业决策。他的研究成果广泛发表于国际学术期刊,包括Journal of Accounting Research,Management Science,Journal of Financial Economics。其学术成果被主流媒体及业界平台广泛引用,如The Wall Street Journal, Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg, INSEAD Knowledge, Harvard Business Review等。